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(U) The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Information
Systems Security (INFOSEC) Studies and Research (NPS
CISR) is developing a comprehensive program in INFOS-
EC education and research that can become a resource for
DoN/DoD and U.S Government in terms of educational
materials and research. A security track within the Com-
puter Science curriculum has been established. Its philo-
sophical core is the abstract notion of conceptually
complete security mechanism, the Reference Monitor Con-
cept. Building upon a core curriculum of computer science
and engineering, the security courses convey vital concepts
and techniques associated with INFOSEC today.
(U) INTRODUCTION
(U) Twenty-five years ago, computers were still largely
monolithic mainframes, physically isolated from cyber-
predators and closely tended by dedicated staffs of techni-
cal and administrative personnel. Even then, when comput-
ers were the domain of scientists and engineers, the need
for computer security was recognized and programs to
achieve it were pursued [13]. Today, code is moved across
the vast reaches of the World Wide Web and ad hoc net-
works are created from commercial products, many having
questionable security properties.
(U) In response to a growing concern regarding the vulner-
ability of the National Information Infrastructure, a 1996
Defense Science Board [1] study cited the need for broader
and deeper education in the building of resilient systems. In
particular, the task force noted that to address the challenge
of information warfare-protect (IW-P), a cadre of computer
scientists with M.S. and Ph.D. degrees with specialization
in Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) is needed.
The study recommended curriculum development at the
undergraduate and graduate levels in resilient system de-
sign practices.
(U) The Naval Postgraduate School a(NPS) anticipated this
recommendation by five years. Starting in the early 1990s,
the Computer Science Department at NPS has developed a
program in INFOSEC and in 1996 established the Naval
Postgraduate School Center for INFOSEC Studies and Re-
search (NPS CISR). Today, NPS CISR involves the re-
search of eight faculty and staff members, nine thesis stu-
dents, and approximately 150 students from the Computer
Science, Information Technology Management and Infor-
mation Warfare curricula participating in classes and labo-
ratory work annually.
(U) NPS CISR is serving as a model program which can be
emulated by both DoD and civilian universities. It address-
es the INFOSEC research and education needs of DoD and
U.S. Government in the following major areas.
• (U)  Curriculum development ensures that a coherent and
comprehensive program in INFOSEC foundations and
technology is presented at the university and postgradu-
ate levels.
• (U)  Development of the INFOSEC and Trusted Systems
Laboratory supports the INFOSEC teaching and research
programs at NPS.
• (U)  Faculty development fosters the insertion of
INFOSEC concepts at appropriate points in general com-
puter science courses and involves interested faculty
members in leading-edge INFOSEC research problems.
• (U)  A Visiting Professor program which brings
INFOSEC experts to NPS to offer courses and engage in
research with faculty and students.
• (U)  An Invited Lecture series injects commercial and
military relevance into the NPS CISR activities.
• (U)  An academic outreach program permits other, non-
CISR academic institutions to benefit from the INFOSEC




• (U)  An effort to insure that NPS CISR graduates are
identified so that their expertise can be applied to the
wide variety of INFOSEC challenges in DoD and U.S.
Government.
• (U)  Research, focusing on INFOSEC problems, with
emphasis on those of DoN, DoD, and U.S. Government.
(U) This paper will provide a synopsis of the NPS CISR
curriculum with motivation for its philosophical approach.
(U) COMPUTER SCIENCE AT NPS
(U) The educational program at NPS CISR is based upon
the recognition that INFOSEC solutions must be designed,
implemented and managed by individuals who understand
which solutions work and which are merely speculation
and hyperbole. A solid grounding in the principles of com-
puter science combined with INFOSEC specialization
courses prepares graduates to tackle current and future IN-
FOSEC challenges.
(U) The Computer Security option is a specialization area
within the two-year, eight-quarter Masters degree program
at the Naval Postgraduate School. A rigorous core curricu-
lum of traditional computer science offered in the first year
is required of all students and prepares them for the any of
an number of specialty tracks. Courses include the theory
of formal languages, computer systems principles, object-
oriented programming, data structures, artificial intelli-
gence, operating systems, software methodology, database
systems, computer communications and networks, comput-
er graphics or interactive computation, computer security,
and the design and analysis of algorithms.
(U) Each student’s course of study is capped by a written
thesis, most often based on research directed by a faculty
member in the student’s chosen specialization option. Of-
ten motivated students start students well in advance of the
official sixth quarter start time. Since faculty research is
generally centered on topics of interest to DoD and U.S.
Government, student thesis research accrues many benefits
beyond creative thinking, analysis, and development of
presentation skills.
(U) The curriculum for the INFOSEC track has been de-
signed to meet the following general objectives:
• (U)  To provide both introductory and advanced courses,
• (U)  To provide courses accessible by students who are
not in the Computer Science curriculum, including those
studying management or acquisition
• (U)  To insure that Computer Science students have a
strong foundation upon which to base advanced course
work in computer science and INFOSEC,
• (U)  To involve students in ongoing computer security
and INFOSEC research and technology development,
• (U)  To enhance students’ laboratory experience through
practical experience in the use of secure systems, and
(U) SECURITY PHILOSOPHY AND BALANCE
(U) A serious problem facing educators addressing com-
puter security and IW-P is balancing the need to equip
graduates with knowledge and facility in the use of current
tools and technologies to address immediate security
threats, against the goal of education in the fundamental
principles of computer security required for the develop-
ment of practical and effective security solutions for both
near-term and long-range systems. In the NPS CISR curric-
ulum, we integrate current tools and technologies experi-
ence into a rigorous program based on foundational
concepts in computer security.
(U) The fundamental security idea that provides the foun-
dation for the entire NPS CISR curriculum is the Reference
Monitor Concept [3]. This encompasses a notion of com-
pleteness that is absent from more intuitive and/or ad hoc
approaches to computer security. The idea that a policy en-
forcement mechanism is always invoked, cannot be modi-
fied by unauthorized individuals, and is inspectable so that
one can assess whether or not it works correctly is applica-
ble over a broad range of security policies and mechanisms.
This allows us to pursue a theory of computer security [7]
and a corresponding engineering discipline. This also dem-
onstrates that it is possible to design systems which are less
susceptible to recurrent cycles of penetrations and patches
[12].
(U) REFERENCE MONITOR EXAMPLE
(U) In any system it is assumed that there are active enti-
ties, in computer security parlance they are called subjects,
and passive entities, called objects. The Reference Monitor
Concept articulates the abstract notion that there can be a
mechanism to mediate the accesses of subjects to objects. It
encompasses three properties:
• (U)  It is tamperproof
• (U)  It is always invoked
• (U)  It is small enough so that it can be analyzed for com-
pleteness and correctness.
(U)  A simple example of failure to implement an instance
of the Reference Monitor Concept illustrates why it is cen-
tral to any sound security architecture.
(U) Hypothesize a PCMCIA card (smart card) issued by
“Seashore Bank”1. Programmed by the bank, the card en-




various cryptographic protocols. Assume that the card is
tamperproof. (It is known that given sufficient work, the
card may not be not be tamperproof, but it is “good
enough.” [4]) Each user is also provided with card driver
software and application software for a number of banking
functions. We assume that the smart cards plug into a PC-
MCIA device port [5].
Figure 1: (U) Hypothetical PC for Banking Applications
(U) The system architecture shown in Figure 1. Of particu-
lar note is the independence of the smart card and the mo-
dem.
(U) The customer assumes that transactions with the bank
are protected by the use of the cryptography available in
the smart card. For example, if the customer wishes to send
some personal information to the bank, it will be encrypted
to protect the confidentiality of the information. Unfortu-
nately our unsuspecting user does not know that the Refer-
ence Monitor Concept was not considered in the system
design, so many things can go wrong.
(U) Our user happens to be an inveterate World Wide Web
aficionado and when visiting a “cool” site, downloaded a
fancy multi media package. Unknown to the user, this
package contained a clandestine artifice so that when it was
executed, a few unexpected things happened. It exploited a
flaw in the operating system to implant new code to service
banking requests. Now, instead of encrypting the user’s
personal information by calling the smart card for encryp-
tion services nothing is done. (An alternative would be to
apply a trivial cipher to the data.) User information is sent
to the modem unencrypted. The smart card’s encryption
services have been bypassed.
1. (U) This name is intended to be fictitious.
(U) There are endless variations on this scenario including
modifications to the application, exploitation of various op-
erating system flaws, subversion of the driver, and so on. In
all cases, the outcome is the same: there was no way to be
certain that the encryption protocol is being followed.
(U) Identification and repair of the operating system flaw
that allowed the attack, is only a temporary fix until another
flaw is identified and exploited. The malicious multi media
package may be frequently updated by its mischievous de-
velopers, so that although a user system may contain patch-
es to the known vulnerabilities exploited by the malicious
software, other vulnerabilities are still available for attack.
It would be impossible to enumerate all of the possible
ways that the system could be exploited.
(U) Thus the user community and the bad guys end up in a
game of “penetrate and patch.” The good guys have to plug
up all of the possible holes in their system while the bad
guys need only find one vulnerability in order to launch a
successful attack.
(U) How could this happen? How could it be prevented?
The user expected the smart card to be “always invoked,”
but it hasn’t been. Why? Because the smart card is part of a
larger system that includes drivers, operating system, and
application-level software. The smart card may do its en-
cryption job very well, but if there is no reliable way to en-
sure that it will be used correctly and for every
transmission to the bank, then, in terms of security, the sys-
tem is incomplete. Secure system design principles require
that protection critical components are always used and are
protected from tampering. Had this been done, the user’s
personal information would have been safe. For example,
had the operating system been designed so that it was self
protecting, then malicious application-level software would
be unable to change it.
(U) A simple redesign is illustrated in Figure 2. It is not a
complete security solution (you need to take our classes to
have the entire picture), but provides an example of one as-
pect of a good security engineering design. Here it is im-
possible to use the modem to send information to the bank
without invoking the smart card. Thus there is assurance
that the information flows through the smart card.
(U) Unlike many other things in this world, computers are
designed to do what they are told to do. Hence if a comput-
er is designed to limit access to critical programs and infor-
mation to only those authorized to read and/or modify it,
then it will always follow those instructions. (Admittedly,
this is easier said than done, but it is a notion based on the
idea that computers are built to perform the same task con-
sistently: that at the lowest level bits are either set to zero or














(U) NPS CISR COURSES
(U) Our emphasis on the Reference Monitor Concept is
tempered with course work intended to provide a perspec-
tive on the many areas that contribute to computer security.
By creating a coherent sequence of courses, students gain a
progressively deeper understanding of many principles and
techniques that span various areas of computer security.
This foundation prepares students to address research and
operational problems in INFOSEC after graduation.
Through case studies, students understand how past prob-
lems have been solved and have an opportunity to consider
current topics.
(U) Advanced courses provide focused coverage of specif-
ic topics such as security policies and formal models, data-
base security, security engineering, and network security.
Seminar courses afford opportunities for advanced students
to read and discuss current research areas in computer se-
curity. Electives drawn from other departments, such as
mathematics and electrical engineering, permit students to
explore subjects such as cryptography or hardware security
in greater depth.
(U) The ultimate objective of all INFOSEC studies is to
improve security in real systems. Thus, practical laboratory
experience is crucial to an effective INFOSEC program.
Laboratory exercises including tutorials and projects rein-
force and extend concepts conveyed in lectures and prepare
students for effective thesis research. Students use a variety
of trusted systems and explore topics in security policy en-
forcement, security technology for database systems,
monolithic and networked trusted computing techniques,
and tools to support the development of trusted systems.
(U) Two courses, Introduction to Computer Security and
Management of Secure Systems, complement each other
and provide a survey of INFOSEC principles and tech-
niques. They review both the conceptually complete and
more intuitive approaches to INFOSEC providing students
with an appreciation of both foundational concepts and cur-
rent practice in computer security.
(U) By design, Introduction to Computer Security may
be taken by science and engineering students early during
their tenure at NPS. Benefits are: a larger number of DoD
personnel with a broad overview of INFOSEC issues; early
sensitization to key principles in computer security leading
to an appreciation of the interplay of security with other as-
pects of computer and distributed systems science and en-
gineering. Our position as a DoD university is reflected in
some course units, however, most or the topics covered are
universal. They include: Risk Analysis, Disaster Recovery,
Access Controls and Authentication, System Maintenance,
Cryptography, Emanations Security, Audit Management,
Protocols, Key Management, Configuration Management
and Backups, Privacy Issues, User Monitoring, Personnel
Issues, Physical Security. Additional topics are included as
needed. Broad rather than deep, the course provides the ba-
sis for advanced security studies.
(U) Management of Secure Systems complements Intro-
duction to Computer Security and includes lectures and ex-
tensive laboratory and field exercises covering risk
analysis, certification and accreditation, system mainte-
nance tools, and organizational aspects of INFOSEC, with
particular focus on military systems [2].
(U) Network Security for both open systems and military
networks. Students review the cryptography and protocols
commonly employed in networked systems. Approaches to
key management in small and large scale enterprises are
explored. Case studies allow students to understand the
complexity of applying these techniques to DoN, DoD, and
Government systems.
(U) Database Security is being developed to include not
only traditional database security, but issues associated
with workflow and transaction processing.
(U) Secure Systems is intended to provide students with an
in depth understanding of the principles and techniques
employed in building secure systems. Starting with funda-
mental concepts associated with protection in information
systems [11]. Students learn how software engineering
principles such as modularity and layering, minimization,
configuration management, and the fault hypothesis meth-
















(U) Security Policies, Models and Formal Methods cov-
ers the methods used to specify, model, and verify compu-
tational systems enforcing information integrity and
confidentiality policies. Foundational issues associated
with protection mechanisms [9] are presented. The identifi-
cation of the security policy and its interpretation in terms
of a technical policy for automated systems is covered. In-
formal and formal security policy models for access-con-
trol and information flow are reviewed [6][8]. Laboratory
work helps students master the theoretical underpinnings of
computer security and apply these concepts in a logical
framework for proving system properties, i.e., the Stanford
Research Institute Proof Verification System (PVS) [10].
(U) Advanced Topics in Computer Security is a seminar
course and is intended for advanced graduate students.
Here we study the most recent papers and developments.
(U) Thesis Research Master of Science theses have ex-
plored and are exploring diverse areas including: security
policies, multilevel security, intrusion detection, issues as-
sociated with downgrading on automated systems, applica-
tions of cryptography, and web security.
(U) Faculty research interests influence thesis topic choic-
es, however, should a student identify a valid topic outside
of the usual areas, every effort is made to accommodate
their research within the NPS CISR program.
(U) CONCLUSION
(U) NPS CISR is developing a comprehensive program in
INFOSEC education and research that can become a re-
source for DoN/DoD and U.S Government in terms of edu-
cational materials and research. Building upon the
foundations of computer science laid by the department’s
core curriculum, the security track conveys vital concepts
and techniques associated with INFOSEC today. NPS
CISR research programs permit students to conduct thesis
work addressing DoD/DoN/U.S. Government concerns.
(U) The NPS CISR program is still young and substantial
effort is still required to firmly establish our multi-faceted
program and make it an ongoing success.
(U) A major benefit of our program is the education of
computer scientists and engineers whose understanding IN-
FOSEC issues and potential solutions can contribute to the
security of the information infrastructure.
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